Abstract-The Time-Triggered Ethernet (TTE) protocol is becoming widely used in safety-critical environments where failures cannot be tolerated. In this paper, a PRISM model for a TT-Ethernet is proposed based on its specification. A set of TTE properties is proposed as well. Finally, using PRISM model checker, a formal model is proposed in the form of a finite state machine. Using this approach, we were able to identify one faulty state within the network that might cause massive damage to a real-life application, thus revealing a possible weak point in Time-Triggered Ethernet.
INTRODUCTION
Time-Triggered Ethernet (TTE) [1] , [2] is a new Local Area Network protocol, which builds on top of Ethernet and adds to it a deterministic time and event triggered communication layer. The infrastructure of this novel protocol is designed for mixed criticality systems, allowing transit of data from different dataflows from applications bearing different criticality levels such as aerospace and health-care applications or data-backup networks.
The principle on which TTE bases its functionality upon is the creation of a time partition among all the nodes within a network, assigning a time frame for each node in which that node will be allowed to send messages. This is known as Time-triggered communication or time-division multipleaccess (TDMA) and it is achieved by synchronizing the clocks of all the participants of a network, allowing a deterministic system behaviour where the possibility of data collision due to two nodes transmitting at the same time is excluded by design and enforced by guardian functions when applicable.
Fault-tolerant TTE must be able to identify and isolate failure occurrences in the network so it may be able to avoid the propagation of such failures. It does that by relying on guardian functions on the switches. The guard function can be implemented with a Semantic Filter function -whenever a device receives a control frame in port X it checks if that control frame is allowed to be received on that port-or with a Leaky Bucket function -the switch limits the number of frames received from a node for a configurable amount of time.
Despite its high level of sophistication and the use of formal methods in the development of some of its faulttolerant algorithms, the protocol was never verified as a whole network scenario and, as stated in the specification document, it may contain faults. Thus, implementation for safety-critical environments, as of today, relies on testing to search for possible faulty states and redundancy to ensure fault-free functionality. Testing is widely used as a proof measure for network protocols and many of the protocols considered fieldproven today were conceived and perfected through exhaustive testing to identify and fix faults inherent to their designs.
The objective of this research is to model a state-driven closed-world scenario encompassing all the elements of a network, making use of the TTE standard, and then formally verify it using Probabilistic Symbolic Model Checker (PRISM). The use of PRISM was motivated by its statistical capabilities; something that allows us to run comparative analysis on our result values. With the help of PRISM's "experiment" tool, it is possible to change the values of different constants in the system on the fly and have the results plotted on a graph for later examination and interpretation. Our design is largely based on the descriptions available in [2] , [3] , [6] , [7] and we take [4] into account for modeling our clock synchronization function. To our knowledge, this is the first time TTE protocol has been verified as a complete network scenario at high-level abstraction, which allows us to study the behaviour of the TTE network and verify relations between its multiple components.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows: in section II we give a brief introduction to PRISM and Probabilistic Model Checking. In section III we present some general aspects regarding the behaviour of TTE Protocol. In section IV we present our network models and explain some important design choices. We discuss the results of our verification in section V. We present the most relevant related work in section VI and in section VII we conclude this paper and present some possible future works.
II. PRISM MODEL CHECKER
Probabilistic model checking is a formal verification technique applied on systems that present a random or probabilistic behavior. One of the most notable features of this technique is not only being able to receive probabilities as an input but also to return probabilities as output. Given that a perfect, bug-free system is something near impossible to achieve, probabilistic model checking allows the user to work with tolerance percentages rather than absolute valuessomething that's very common in communication protocols. Probabilistic model checking can deal with a wide range of quantitative measures, the results show an exact figure of the property being verified (usually in parts-per-hundred), it can be fully automated (model construction plus numerical solution), provides an exhaustive analysis of the model (accounting all possible initial states and model parameter values as well as all possible process scheduling) and it is very efficient. The downsides are that even though it can identify patterns, trends and anomalies in quantitative results, it provides no counter-examples and it suffers from state-space explosion.
PRISM [10] is a free, open source probabilistic model checker developed at the University of Birmingham. Its highlevel modeling language is based on modules, each composed by a set of guarded commands. Another very important feature of PRISM is the ability to synchronize modules by making use of action labels. PRISM supports a wide range of model analysis methods and it features a very efficient implementation, making use of a symmetry reduction technique [12] in order to avoid state-space explosion. PRISM operates by creating a probabilistic model of the system and computing its reachable states. The model checking is done by dynamically creating graph-based computations [13] in order to reach a numerical solution (based on linear equation systems and optimization problems).
In our research, we used PRISM version 3.3.1, as it was the latest release at the time we started this project. Since that version does not support Probabilistic Timed Automata [9] (PTA), we represent time in our model with Markov decision processes [11] (MDP) combined to labeled statements synchronized to an incrementing counter that acts as the clock.
III. TTN BEHAVIOUR
There are two types of TTE configuration: Standard TTE ( Figure 1 ) -with standard controllers and one switch-and Fault-Tolerant TTE ( Figure 2 ) -with a safety-critical TTE controller where every connection is redundant [2, 15] . We have considered two scenarios in order to cover both standard and fault-tolerant modes. Both network scenarios are closedworld (number of nodes is limited and known a priori) and we always assume a fault-free, collision-free start up scenario.
The models written in PRISM language resemble a flow chart, focusing on the transitions between states of a system, without much attention for the actual transfer of data. For this reason our TTE model is focused on the general behaviour of the network, following the TTE specification, rather than the internal functionality of each component. Our intention is to model the relationship between the different components inside the network, rather than the components themselves.
Another general consideration is that a message is composed from a random number of packets. Here in our case, only the fact of sending is relevant. Every packet must receive an acknowledgement, with the exception of the last one where, in lack of an acknowledgement for a set period of time, the client will assume the packet was received successfully.
Every hardware component that we are modeling in PRISM is given a probability for failure, respecting the number of failures admissible in each of the network scenarios (one failure for the first scenario and two failures for the second scenario). It is important to notice that even though the probabilities of hardware failure in our system are not based on real-world specifications, this makes no difference since our objective is to verify the protocol's reaction once the failures have occurred to determine which, if any, are its susceptibilities to faults.
IV. SCENARIOS
We propose to design our scenarios around basic constructions of clients ( Figure 4 ) and switches ( Figure 5 ). These finite state-machines show the main functionality of each component in the network. These components are combined later to form scenarios A and B. All the TTE specifics are inserted directly in the PRISM code in the form of labels and guards.
Our first scenario describes a Standard TTE configuration, with three clients connected to a server through a single switch. Only the clients are able to send messages and the only possible destination is the server. With the exception of the server -including the wired connection between the switch and the server), hardware failures can be introduced in any element of the network (clients, switch or wiring) but since this scenario works with the assumption of Single-Fault Hypothesis, only one element may fail in each run. There's a back-up switch that will come online in case of catastrophic hardware failure of the main network switch and in case of wiring failure, only one connection will be affected. It is also important to note that there are two possible scenarios for client failure: silent and non-silent. In silent failure the client will become mute from that point onwards and in non-silent failure the client will start sending garbage-data whenever it has the chance.
This scenario uses a simple Master/Slave one-step synchronization protocol where the single master will calculate the synchronization clock, based on its internal clock, and broadcast it to the rest of the network, thus we ignore the TTE Compression Function.
The second scenario runs under the same basic principles described in the first, but with some differences. This scenario simulates a safety-critical network with double-failure hypothesis and a multi-master two-step clock synchronization, where the existence of more than one synchronization master requires an extra step for generating the synchronization clock. The multiple synchronization masters will send a control frame each to a compression master that will calculate an average value based on the latencies of those control frames as they arrive. Then the compression master sends a new control frame that will be used to synchronize the local clocks in the synchronization masters, as described in [3] .
The configuration consists of five nodes (clients) and two switches/guardians on a star network configuration. The guardian uses a Leaky Bucket function. Every connection is redundant. There is a backup shadow-switch in case of catastrophic hardware failure of one of the original switches. In this scenario any two faults can happen at any given time with the only exception being that only one switch may fail per run since the scenario has only one backup and the safetycritical protocol requires at least two functioning switches.
In our scenarios we are verifying a set of eight properties that, if held true, will guarantee the network is running according to TTE specifications.
The way we perform the verification of the protocol (Figure 3 ) is by creating a set of state-triggered flags (Boolean variables) inside the model, in PRISM code. Whenever a certain state is reached, a specific flag will become true to mark that event (like entering transmission mode) and, whenever applicable, if that event is no longer true the flag will be set to false (like exiting transmission mode). We, then, use a set of assertions, based on the TTE specification document, about these flags that should always hold true. Following are the PCTL formulas, having always node "A" in mind (note that in our model we have a set of assertions for each node):
1. The transmission only starts after successful synchronization of the node;
Where "Synch" represents that the node has successfully synchronized with the network and "Tr" shows that a transmission is in process. The letter after each variable identifies the node. Where "Time_A" is a flag that becomes true when the system clock enters the time partition assigned to node A.
Every node has its own unique time partition;
Where "Tp_A" is a flag that becomes true only if "Time_A" is different than the "Time" of all other nodes.
6. A sent packet will be received by the destination;
[G ("Snd_A" => F "Rcv_B") ]
Where "Snd" represents that a packet has been sent and "Rcv" represents that a packet has been received.
7. To every message sent there would be an acknowledgement;
[G ("Snd_A" => F "Ack_A") ]
Where "Ack" represents that an acknowledgement message has arrived.
8. Every transmission will eventually end.
[G ("Tr_A" => F "Tend_A") ]
Where "Tend" is a flag that becomes true when the transmission ends.
V. RESULTS
We verified our scenarios in PRISM Model Checker using Markov Decision Process (MDP) model [5] , which provides a mathematical framework for modeling decision situations where the outcome combines random and non-deterministic results. Although it may seem like a contradiction to use a non-deterministic model to verify a protocol where all communications occur in a deterministic manner, it is important to note that TTE is built on top of Ethernet, which a non-deterministic protocol. We reckon one of the challenges of implementing TTE is to turn a non-deterministic protocol (Ethernet) into a deterministic one, therefore modeling the network in a non-deterministic model in a way that it becomes deterministic is an accurate way of representing TTE.
In the first verification run for both scenarios we supressed the possibility of hardware failure, assuming every component would always function under ideal conditions. We were able to successfully verify both scenarios under these settings and all the properties passed. Then we run a second verification for each scenario allowing hardware failure to happen in a probabilistic manner and PRISM was able to find one state in the second scenario where some property does not hold true.
The faulty state in the second scenario violates property number 3 (at any given point in time there's only one node sending a message) and property number 4 (a node only sends on its time partition). The faulty state may be reached when one of the switches and one of the nodes fail at the exact same time. Whenever a switch fails, communication will be frozen and the backup switch will boot and the synchronization function will synchronize the clocks of both switches and then broadcast the new clock-synch to the entire network and allowing communication to resume. In this particular case where the client fails at the same time as the switch, there is a chance that the random data from the client's non-silent failure will collide with the message from the switch, making the failure to pass unnoticed by the guardians. After this, there is a chance that the second garbage-message from the failing client will collide with the new clock-synch coming from the switches and on top of that, there's a probability that another node will be assigned to the same time partition that is being used by the failing client. When this state is reached, we'll have two nodes assigned to the same time partition, plus one failing node which is not yet known to the network's guardians.
It is important to note that while PRISM could be used to accurately calculate the probability of such state being reached, for our purposes it was more important to identify the faulty state rather than finding its accurate probability of happening. For this reason we used random probabilities that do not reflect reality in our model and thus we are omitting them.
As mentioned before, we always use closed-world scenarios where all elements are known and defined a priori. The reason for this is the limitation of the PRISM language, which does not support the design of open and dynamic models. We attempt to add some level of scalability to our model by writing our PRISM code divided in several processes (modules) and making them as close as possible to the Object Oriented programming paradigm, instead or writing the whole code as one single block. In other words our model consists of several PRISM processes, each uniquely identifiable and performing a specific task in the network. Thanks to this approach we can easily add more elements to the network with some small adjustments to the code. As an example, to add a new node to the network all there is to do is to create a new "Client" process with a new unique ID and update the new number of existing clients in the network switches.
VI. RELATED WORK
Most related work on TTE focus on design and implementation of the protocol or part of it, like a TTE function.
In [6] the research team develops a software implementation of a TTE controller for real-time applications, built on top of a 100Mbit Ethernet controller. It covers important topics about TTE, like its architecture and functionality and it presents the controller's structure for TTE, giving results in form of performance analysis and evaluation of test cases.
In [7] the research team works on the architecture of a TTE switch, presenting how it handles Time and Eventtriggered messages and discussing its general behaviour at low-level and how the switch handles predictable real-time communication as well as being able to work with other networking protocols, such as regular Ethernet. The work's main focus lies on the TTE switch architecture and its functionality. The authors gave experiment results comparing the TTE switch with COTS Ethernet switch.
In [2] we have a very comprehensive presentation of the elements that are present in a TTE setting including all of its main functions and services, its basic definitions, the protocol's requirements, different settings and message types and formats. In our own research, while designing our scenarios, we used this work as a second TTE specification, as it is presented in a very concise and easy to read format.
In [3] the authors discuss an integration of TTE with SpaceWire networks for aerospace applications. This work covers the dataflow and synchronization in TTE and presents the benefits of an integrated TTE-SpaceWire architecture, giving four integration options and the main ideas behind each of them.
The work in [4] is the only related work we could find that uses a formal method to verify a part of TTE protocol. This work focus on the Compression Function of TTE, which is a clock synchronization function that runs inside the TTE switches collecting clock data from the connected systems and calculating a synchronized figure to send to the connected systems as feedback. The formal verification technique used in that work is Yices SMT Solver [8] .
VII. CONCLUSION
We have modeled and verified two deterministic real-time network scenarios using Time-Triggered Ethernet protocol and PRISM Model checker to build a high-level software implementation. Our approach is based on MDP model, which is the most accurate to represent a TTE network on the PRISM tool and we were able to identify one circumstance where TTE's properties will not be respected, likely resulting in catastrophic network failure.
Our work can be used as a reference to further improve the reliability on the already robust TTE protocol and it can be extended by verifying different settings and implementations of that protocol or by going deeper into its many modules and verifying their functionality in detail. We would also like to extend our model to the newest version of the PRISM tool [14] which has true support for timed models such as Probabilistic Timed Automata (PTA) and Priced Probabilistic Timed Automata (PPTA), for better representation of a realworld scenario.
